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Abstract 
It is widely known that relationships and human behaviours such as trust, reciprocity and altru-
ism that are observed in the human societies are capable of facilitating financial transactions. This 
paper proposes a theoretical model to argue that though these elements can facilitate financial 
transactions, they may not always ensure efficiency in the sense of creation of additional wealth. 
As financial resources are scarce, the paper argues that the financial transactions induced by rela-
tionships, trust, reciprocity and altruism may lead to inefficient allocations of resources. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of relationships in financial intermediation is well recognised in the banking and finance litera-
ture. Financial intermediaries often confront the problem of information asymmetry and long established rela-
tionships between the lenders and borrowers can overcome this (Boot, 2000) [1]. Apart from relationships, re-
cent works by experimental economists have well established that financial transactions can also be facilitated 
by human behaviours like altruism, trust and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006 [2]). The importance of these 
behavioural elements has been also recognised by the economists who tried to explain the reasons for intra- 
family financial transfers. A survey of literature on intra-family financial transfers is available in Laferrère and 
Wolff (2006) [3]. 
This paper asks if the financial transactions induced by relationships, trust, reciprocity and altruism can auto-
matically ensure “Efficiency” in the sense of creation of additional wealth that market is otherwise unable to 
provide? It can be explained further by referring to an experiment conducted by Berg et al. (1995) [4]. In the 
experiment a subject “A” transfers a fraction from his initial endowment of $10 to an anonymous subject “B”. 
M. Chowdhury 
 
 852 
The amount transferred is multiplied by 3. B then transfers a fraction of that amount to A. Rationality or sel-
fishness implies that subject A should not transfer any amount to B and B should not transfer any amount to A. 
This attitude however is not maximising their joint wealth, as, if A transfers no amount to B, then the total 
wealth is only $10 compared to the possible maximum of $30. Transactions are Pareto improving when A trusts 
B and transfers some money and B reciprocates by returning the money transferred by A. 
In the actual economy resources are scarce and financial intermediaries are often credit constrained. Extend-
ing credit for one purpose implies a lack credit of for another purpose. Therefore relationships, trust, reciprocity 
and altruism can crowd-out rule based lendings. The transactions as addressed in Berg et al. (1995) [4] improve 
the joint welfare. There should be no objection if transactions based on relationships and behavioural elements 
always create additional wealth. The paper questions if it is the case all the time and argues that it is not. Ac-
tually some transactions can be wealth reducing, that is total wealth is higher if relationships or behavioural ele- 
ments fail to initiate transactions in the first place. This has been illustrated by a theoretical example of a simple 
principal-agent model, where the principal transfers money to the agent after receiving a guarantee from a third 
party. The basic message of the paper is very straight forward, that is relationships, trust, altruism and reciproci-
ty based transactions can be inefficient. The paper serves to exemplify this message further. 
It is possible to find a connection between this paper and the growing literature on individual and corporate 
social responsibility (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010 [5]; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012 [6]). However, it is more 
linked to the growing support for relationship-based banking and networking. Though the paper can be viewed 
as a criticism of relationship-based banking, we are not undermining the importance of it in the actual economy. 
Its importance is already well established, such as past relationships reduced collateral requirements and also 
helped obtaining larger loans (Bharath et al., 2011 [7]) and banking relationships contributed in reducing finan-
cial tension and credit rationing after the financial crisis of 2008 (Gobbi and Sette, 2013 [8]; Bartolia et al., 2013 
[9]). 
The structure of the remaining sections of the paper is as follows. The second section describes the model that 
forms the basis of argument. The third section analyses the conditions where transactions can be efficient or in-
efficient. The final section concludes the paper by providing a direction for future research. 
2. The Model 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the model which forms the basis of arguments in the later parts of the 
paper. We assume that there are three players in the model: 
a. The Principal: who gives the loan, denoted as B(anker). 
b. The Agent: who receives the loan, D(ebtor). 
c. The Guarantor: who performs the role of a G(uarantor). 
B gives loan amount l to D with an agreement that r will be repaid at the end of a pre-agreed period where r > 
l. If the amount is not repaid G is regarded as liable and hence the mechanism solves both adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. 
The assumptions of the model are, 
a. G is altruistic. Altruism is defined as a mental condition as such G gets a psychological benefit from doing 
something good for D. 
b. D reciprocates the behaviour of G. D aims to completely repay the loan so that G does not have to bear the 
burden of repayment of the loan. 
c. B gives the loan on the basis of relationship or trust in G. The relationship and trust can be formed by mu-
tual long term business/social interactions or by availability of collateral to support the loan repayment1. B is not 
altruistic to G or D. B only cares about loan repayment and does not attach any value to the sources of repay-
ment. 
The timeline of the acts are as follows: B lends l to D with a written or non-written contract which is enforce-
able under any contingencies. D invests in the project and exerts effort. The outcome is obtained and r amount is 
repaid to B irrespective of the outcome of the investment. The repayment may come from D or G or a combina-
tion of both. There is no uncertainly in repayment. 
Relationships allow financial institutions to accumulate information about clients over a longer period of time 
 
 
1Social norms can play an important role in enforcing contracts in the absence of formal enforcing mechanisms. Social norms may require G  
under any contingencies, reciprocates the trust of B by ensuring the repayment of the loan. 
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and to develop trust and mutual understanding between banks and clients. As Boots (2000) [1] mentioned, rela-
tionship-based banking leads to the choice between rules and discretion where discretion allows decision making 
based on non-contractable information. There is therefore a trade-off in the use of relationships in financial 
lending from bank’s point of view. The paper is not concerned about this trade off as the bank always makes profit 
from the lending. 
The investment l  gives return ( )lθ 2 with probability p  and 0 with probability 1 p− . The probability of 
the return depends on the effort of D. Following the convention of notation, we denote effort level as e . The 
probability is given as ( )p e  which is concave in effort as such 0p′ >  and 0p′′ < . The effort is defined not 
in term of personal unobservable endeavour but rather as the personal investment of D in the project, which is 
expressible in monetary term. As ( )p e  is concave, the effort of D increases the probability of success of the 
project which implies that the project becomes more capable of attaining the objective. It is possible that θ  
goes up as e  goes up. We ignore that possibility to keep the exposition simple. 
Expected pay off of the project therefore is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 0E p e p e p eθ θ= × + − × =                              (1) 
The income of D from the project minus repayment of loan is: 
( )I p e e rθ= − −                                         (2) 
The project is viable if 0I > . To facilitate loan repayment from only the gross revenue of the project, the 
project needs to generate sufficient gross revenue so that following inequality is satisfied: 
( ) 0Q p e rθ= − ≥                                        (3) 
The gross revenue of the project needs to be mentioned specifically as when a project does not perform well, 
the gross revenue can provide information on repayment possibility. In difficult situations, struggling investors 
sometimes disregard their own monetary and non-monetary costs and look at gross revenues to repay loans. Eq-
uation (3) reflects that situation3. 
Needless to say that, ( )p e eθ −  gives the net revenue of the project. 
3. Economic Efficiency of the Loan 
This section analyses the effort level that D utilises to ensure repayment of the loan. It also analyses if the loan is 
economically viable, i.e. creates more wealth than what was initially available. It is analysed using following 
two cases: 
Case 1: ( )0 0p e rθ − <  
Here, with no effort, the expected income from the project is lower than the amount to be repaid. By assump-
tion, the function ( )p e eθ −  is concave in effort. Hence it has been drawn in Figure 1 as the concave curve 
denoted by ( )p e eθ − . The project is not economically viable as ( )p e eθ −  is never greater than r . The op-
timum loan of the project is therefore 0l = . 
However, given the ex-ante situation that 0l >  and the investment has been made, the agent uses effort lev-
el *e  if he wishes to minimise the gap between r  and the net revenue of the project. But a reciprocal indi-
vidual may not stop there. In order to repay the loan the project must generate sufficient funds. D being a reci-
procal individual may ignore personal investment costs and choose to use effort up to the level where 
( )p e rθ = . Such a point is defined by me . Otherwise D may reciprocate by using effort up to *e  and then 
supplement the remaining amount from additional resources. 
The meaning of the effort e  of the D(ebtor) here requires further attention. e  is defined as D’s own in-
vestment in the project. If the first derivative is positive when 0e = , D should use some effort in the project. It 
is however subject to a limit. If the own investment of D has an upper bound, it may prohibit generation of suf-
ficient funds. If this is the case then the only way the loan can be repaid is through transfer of the guarantor G’s 
fund to B. 
Case 2: If ( )0 0p e rθ − ≥  
Here the project is viable, as without any effort, D gets a non-negative return from the project. The situation is 
depicted in Figure 2. Given that ( )p e eθ −  is concave and first derivative is positive when 0e = , the value of 
 
 
2We assume 0θ ′ >  and 0θ ′′ < . 
3This observation comes from the author’s personal experience of working in a bank. 
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Figure 1. The project is not economically viable.              
 
 
Figure 2. The project is economically viable.                 
 
the function ( )I p e e rθ= − −  increases initially with the effort level, and then after some level it falls. It gives 
the optimum effort level of the project *e . Hence the agent undertakes the project with ex-ante information of 
θ . That is, even before the loan is given to him through the guarantee of G. 
In case 2, the project is viable even without any effort of D. It is also possible that ( )0 0p e rθ − < ; however, 
( ) 0p e e rθ − − ≥  for some e . In that case the project is also viable and D invests when information on the re-
turn of the project is ex-ante available. 
We are now ready to analyse the efficiency of the transactions that is if the transactions create more wealth. 
Our benchmark here is the loan l  that has been transferred to D. If total wealth created is more than l  then 
transactions involving B, G and D are wealth improving. G may or may not transfer some money from his own 
fund to B, which gets cancelled in calculation. Therefore, we only calculate efficiency by taking the monetary 
benefit of the principal and the agent into consideration which are: 
The Principal (B): r l−  
The Agent (D): ( )p e e rθ − −  
The motive of the guarantor G is altruistic. We assume that it is non-expressible in monetary terms4. There-
fore, in total, the monetary benefit of society from the transactions is ( ) ( )r l p e e r p e e lθ θ− + − − = − − . As 
r l>  by assumption (assured through the guarantee of G), B is always willing to extend loan to D irrespective 
of the outcome of the project and the transactions improve his wealth. The benefit of D can be negative or posi-
tive as observed in case 1 and case 2. However, even if the benefit of the D is negative there is a possibility at 
margin that ( ) 0p e e lθ − − ≥  as r l>  i.e. if the loss of D is compensated by the benefit of B. The wealth of 
 
 
4Note that the emphasis of the paper is to evaluate the monetary benefit of transactions, not the social welfare. This is applicable where any 
mechanism of transforming the intrinsic satisfaction of G to monetary values is absent. 
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society increases when ( ) 0p e e lθ − − > . This is not ensured with certainty as it is also possible to have 
( ) 0p e e lθ − − < . Therefore the transactions do not necessarily improve the wealth of society. As we discussed 
earlier, the basis of these transactions is formed by relationships, trust, reciprocity and altruism. In case 2, it ac-
tually leads to efficiency as the transactions create more wealth than the initial amount. However, in case 1 the 
same transactions take place on the basis of relationships, trust, reciprocity and altruism but create less wealth. 
The findings of the case 1 crucially depends on the assumption that θ  and ( )p e  are unknown ex-ante, 
otherwise a rational agent would not take the loan. A scenario like case 1 is unlikely to be observed in formal 
bank lendings. Formal banking applications for loan often require formal project proposals that provide a prior 
understanding of a project’s expected return. The process makes it is possible for a financial institution (and also 
the borrowers) to, with some error, correctly predict the possibility of repayment from a project’s income. The 
informal lending institutions however, may not ask for any formal project proposal. The approval of loans in in-
formal settings depends on the willingness and repayment capability of the borrowers. An existence of business 
or social relationships may convey that assurance to the lender. On the other hand, when made available, bor-
rowers sometimes take loan without paying enough attention to the repayment possibility. The lenders’ willing-
ness to lend and the borrowers’ willingness to take loan in an informal setting can hence result in a situation like 
case 1. We however suggest for conducting empirical analysis to further testing the validly and applicability of 
the analysis in the real world. 
4. Lessons and Conclusions 
This paper provides a simple model to show that relationships, trust, reciprocity and altruism may provide solu-
tions where regular market mechanisms fail but they do not automatically guarantee additional wealth. In the 
example of Figure 2, the project is capable of generating sufficient funds, but the example in Figure 1 shows 
the incapability of a project in generating sufficient funds for repayment of the loan. 
We therefore can conclude that as resources are scarce, relationship, trust, reciprocity and altruism based fi-
nancial intermediation may result in a suboptimal use of financial resources. The growing support for relation-
ships, networking and emphasis of human behavioural elements are overlooking this possibility. The paper used 
a theoretical example, validity of which needs to be evaluated through empirical investigations. We therefore 
suggest for conducting empirical investigations on the subject matter, especially on financial intermediations in 
less developed countries where regulations and governance of financial institutions are known to be less trans-
parent. 
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